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Lindsay P. Ward 
 
 After the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council declined to 
further investigate an amendment that would add two species of fish to a 
management plan, the appellants brought suit stating that federal 
agencies failed to properly manage river herring and shad in the Atlantic 
Ocean. Appellants asserted this inaction triggering judicial review under 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
court refused to find the National Marine Fisheries Services subject to 
judicial review, holding that the Council was not a government agency 
and that not amending the act did not constitute final agency action.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellants, a group composed of a New Jersey shore fishing 
boat captain, a “herring warden”1 and two membership organizations, 
respectively involved in the preservation of fish and promotion of 
fishing, sued the Secretary of Commerce, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(“Fisheries Service”).2 The Appellants claimed that the federal agencies 
had “unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring and shad in 
the Atlantic Ocean from New York to North Carolina.”3 Relying on the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, also known as the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act, and the judicial review provision of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Appellants asserted that the 
Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council failed to properly address a 
suggested amendment to the current management plan.4 The Appellants 
alleged that this determination contravened the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
and triggered judicial review under the APA. 5  However, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed 
                                                        
1.         See generally COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., DIV. OF MARINE 
FISHERIES, TECHNICAL REPORT TR-46: AN ASSESSMENT OF RIVER HERRING STOCKS 
IN MASSACHUSETTS (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/dmf/publications/tr-46.pdf.  
2.  Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664, 666 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. at 666-68.  
5.  Id. 
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and affirmed the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, finding that the Appellants were not entitled to relief under 
either claim.6  
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The goal of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is to “promote domestic 
commercial and recreational fishing under sound conservation and 
management principles.” 7  In furtherance of this aim, the Magnuson-
Stevens Act set up eight regional Fishery Management Councils, 
providing each with “authority over a specific geographic region and 
[whish are] composed of members who represent the interests of the 
states included in that region.” 8 The Magnuson-Stevens Act’s territory, 
termed the “exclusive economic zone,” is extended 200 miles seaward 
from each states’ coastline.9  
The Magnuson-Stevens Act provides that the Fishery 
Management Councils “shall” put forward fishery management plans and 
implement regulations “for each fishery under its authority that requires 
conservation and management.”10  Fishery plans are altered for a variety 
of reasons: to set yearly quotas for individual species, to restrict the gear 
used to catch specific species and to add species to the plan.11 A Fishery 
Management Council will accept proposed plan changes by a majority 
vote of the members who are currently there and voting.12 These regional 
councils, such as the Mid-Atlantic Council (“Council”), have no 
authority to disseminate a federal rule, but instead send proposed 
amendments to the Fisheries Service.13 The Fisheries Service then starts 
a comment period, which aids with the decision to accept, decline, or 
partially accept the suggested amendments. 14  If the Fisheries Service 
neglects to make any response thirty days after the termination of the 
                                                        
6.  Id. at 672. 
7.  16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (2012). 
8.  C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1557-58 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012)).  
9.  16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1); see Exclusive Economic Zone of the United 
States of America, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983). 
10.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 667 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 
1852(h)(1)). 
11.  Id. at 668. 
12.  Id. at 667. 
13.  Id.  
14.  16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(3)(C) (2012).  
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comment period, an amendment submitted by a Fishery Management 
Council is treated “as if approved.”15 
In 2012, the Council started considering an amendment 
(“Amendment 15”) to the Mackerel, Squid, and Butterfish Fishery 
Management Plan. Amendment 15 was proposed to add both river 
herring and shad to the purview of the Mackerel, Squid, and Butterfish 
Fishery Management Plan.16 River herring and shad are consumed by 
other species, including striped bass, and the amendment would have 
safeguarded these species within the Magnuson-Stevens Act exclusive 
economic zone.17  After consideration of Amendment 15, the Council 
determined that it would create a “working group” that would reconsider 
the amendment in three years. 18  The Appellants asserted that this 
decision violated judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act and 
the APA.19 If a Fishery Management Council decides not to complete an 
essential management plan or amendment, the Fisheries Service is “‘the 
party responsible for that action’ . . . [as] it ‘must fulfill its statutory 
responsibility as a backstop’ to the Council.”20 The D.C. District Court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the 
Appellants were not entitled judicial review of the Council’s decision.21  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Judicial Review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
 
The Magnuson-Stevens Act holds that there will be judicial 
review of “[r]egulations promulgated by the Secretary under this [Act] 
and . . . actions that are taken by the Secretary under regulations which 
implement a fishery management plan.”22 The Magnuson-Stevens Act 
incorporates sections of judicial review under the APA. Notably, the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act does not integrate § 706(1), the provision that 
enables a court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed.” 23  The Appellants argued that the Council’s 
                                                        
15.  Id.  
16.  Notice of Initiation of Scoping Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,867 (Oct. 
31, 2012). 
17.  Appellants’ Br. 2.  
18.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 668. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 669 (citing Appellants’ Br. 30 (quoting Guidon v. Pritzker, 31 
F. Supp. 3d 169, 197-98 (D.D.C. 2014))). 
21.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 667. 
22.  Id. at 668 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)-(2) (2012). 
23. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012)). 
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choice fell under “actions that [were] taken by the Secretary under 
regulations which implement a fishery management plan” and therefore 
implicated judicial review.24 They asserted that the Council’s decision to 
end the amendment process with a three-year postponement to reexamine 
constituted an “action [by the Secretary or the Fisheries Service] under 
the regulations that define all Mid-Atlantic fisheries.”25 The D.C. Circuit  
Court of Appeals found this to be clearly incorrect; “it was the Mid-
Atlantic Council, not the Secretary or the Fisheries Service, who tabled 
Amendment 15.”26  
The Appellants’ attempts to connect the Mid-Atlantic Council’s 
actions to the Fisheries Service also fail.27 They abandoned an argument 
advanced in their complaint that the Fisheries Service’s regional 
administrator’s vote against the amendment was associated with the 
Fisheries Service. 28  Shifting track on appeal, The Appellants argued 
instead that the Fisheries Service is accountable for the action or 
inactions of the Council. 29  The court found this to be a sweeping 
assertion; “even if the Fisheries Service had such a broad, mandatory 
duty to act as a ‘backstop’. . .  this would at most obligate the Fisheries 
Service to act when the Council fails to do so.”30 Additionally, the court 
found the decisions cited by the Appellants failed to promote their 
arguments. 31  The court distinguished the cases because in them the 
Fisheries Services had completed a federal agency action, prompting 
judicial review under 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1).32 Here, the Appellants took 
issue not with a Fisheries Service action, but the act of the Council.33   
 
B.  Judicial Review under the APA 
 
The court then addressed the claim to judicial review advanced 
by the Appellants under the APA. Section 706(1) allows judicial review, 
provided the several conditions are met.34 The court, examining “final 
                                                        
24.  Id. (citing U.S.C. § 1855(f)(2)). 
25.  Appellants’ Br. 26. 
26.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 669. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Angler Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 70 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435-
36 (D.D.C. 2014). 
29.  Appellants’ Br. 30. 
30.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 669. 
31.  Id. (citing Flaherty v. Bryson, 850 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Oceana Inc. v. Pritzker, 24 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.D.C. 2014)).  
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. at 670. 
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agency action,” concluded that the Council, as a non-governmental 
agency, fell outside of the scope of this judicial review provision. 35 
Furthermore, the Council is not a defendant in the suit and so the court 
lacks jurisdiction to review its findings.36 However, the court went on to 
assert that even if the Council was a federal agency, the inaction it took 
was not a “final agency action.”37 In reaching this decision, the court 
compared the Council’s decision to the Secretary’s census report, where 
the President of the United States can and does accept the report without 
alterations, but may order the Secretary to make changes that do not 
constitute a final action.38  
The Appellants’ assertion that agency inaction violated the APA 
strikes most closely at the crux of their complaint, yet failed to enter the 
realm of a valid claim.39 APA § 706(1), which allows courts to “compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld,” has not been incorporated into the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act. 40  The court hypothesized that the Appellants 
applied § 706(1) because they found that agency inaction has no other 
remedy in court, “so judicial review pursuant to § 706(1) must be 
available.” 41  Because the government has allowed APA § 706(1) to 
“provide a basis for relief in cases under the Magnuson-Stevens Act,” the 
court assumed for the sake of argument that the section did apply.42 
Regardless of the hypothetical application of § 706(1), the court 
concluded that Appellants would still be unsuccessful.43  
Judicial review under APA § 706(1) is prompted only by agency 
responsibility that establishes “a specific, unequivocal command.” 44 
Delving into the authority granted to the Secretary by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, the court determined it to be an elective, not an unequivocal 
command.45 A statute that employs both “shall” and “may” is held to 
operate under the common usage of the terms; shall indicates a duty 
required, while may signals an option.46 The Magnuson-Stevens Act uses 
                                                        
35.  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).  
36.  Id. at 669. 
37.  Id. at 669-70. 
38.  Id. at 670. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 543 U.S. 55, 62 
(2004)). 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Norton, 542 U.S. at 63-64.  
45.  Anglers Conservation Network, 809 F.3d at 671. 
46.  Id.  
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both terms, indicating that the typical understanding of may controls.47 
The court honed in on the provision that states that the Fisheries Service 
can employ its discretion when determining whether to make a plan for a 
fishery that “requires conservation and management.” 48  If, the court 
conjectured, the provision was actually mandatory, then its requirement 
would be “largely redundant” as there is already an over-arching plan for 
these types of fisheries.49 
Finally, the court addressed The Appellants’ claim that river 
herring and shad embodied “overfished stocks.”50 The court found this to 
be lacking a factual basis.51 The Fisheries Service is only required to 
develop a management plan if “the Secretary determines . . . that a 
fishery is overfished.”52 In this case, the Secretary had not made the 
determination that either species is overfished.53 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
This decision seems to be a fairly straightforward application of 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the APA. However, it could be 
considered notable for the definitions the court provides. The court drew 
a line demarcating when an action becomes a final action. Additionally, 
the D.C. Circuit refused to find the Mid-Atlantic Council to be a 
government agency. The Magnuson-Stevens Act established these 
Fishery Management Councils, which are given management authority 
over the fisheries in their respective regions. Members are nominated by 
state Governors and the councils fall under the authority of the Secretary 
of Commerce. Still, the court declined to designate these councils agents 
of the government. Further, the court concluded that the Fisheries 
Services does not act as a “backstop” to a council’s conclusions, and 
even if it was burdened by this obligation, it would not be held 
accountable for the councils’ inaction.  
                                                        
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)).  
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 671-72. 
51.  Id. at 672. 
52.  Id. at 671-72 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(2)). 
53.  Id. at 672. 
